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Abstract
Despite endorsing an anti-corruption plan for the Asia-Pacifi c, the 
governments of the region are burdened by endemic corruption that 
hampers governance in the region. Corruption remains a highly emotive 
issue, subject to normative judgments that cannot serve as a foundation 
for the planning or materializing of rational plans that might lead to its 
curtailment. 
 This article looks at the effect of selected factors empirically on the 
degree of corruption across several countries of the Asia Pacifi c region. 
The primary objective is to verify the prior academic work that links 
openness, as defi ned by the ratio of volume of international trade, to a 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a reduction in corruption 
for the Asia Pacifi c region exclusively.
 The article also examines the popular perception that associates a 
rise in per capita GDP with reduced corruption for the Asia-Pacifi c region. 
The affect of other factors such as the population density of a country, 
its military expenditure and amount of arable land, are also examined. 
The results are tested to see if they are robust enough to be used across 
different datasets that can account for the degree of corruption in a 
country. The relationship between the prescribed variables varies slightly 
with the corruption dataset used.
Keywords: Asia-Pacifi c region, corruption, GDP per capita, openness, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) Regression, Ordered Probit Models. 
Introduction
This article seeks to determine the factors that affect the degree of corruption in various 
countries of the Asia-Pacifi c region. It will incorporate the use of an Ordered Probit 
model, which will identify the factors seen as commonly infl uencing corruption in the 
region. These are then used to evaluate the effect they have on the degree of corruption, as 
measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index, constructed by Political 
Risk Services (PRS), and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency 
International (TI). 
  This article is a revised version of my paper that was selected for presentation at the 6th East-West Center 
International Graduate Student Conference, East-West Center, Honolulu, 15-17 February, 2007. I would 
like to thank Eiji Mangyo and Donghun Kim for their helpful suggestions and comments.
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 In this regard, one of the objectives of this article is to verify prior academic studies 
that link openness, as defi ned by the ratio of volume of international trade to a country’s 
GDP, with a reduction in corruption. The other objective is to analyze the second most 
popular perception that associates a rise in per capita GDP with a reduction in corruption. 
The possible relation between corruption and other factors, such as the population density 
of a country, its military expenditure and amount of arable land, are also examined. The 
overall aim of this article is to examine the individual signifi cance of chosen independent 
variables on the corruption index, i.e. the degree of corruption.
 Corruption has been identifi ed as a signifi cant hindrance to the developmental 
efforts of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has projected that corruption can reduce a country's GDP by more than 0.5 percent. The 
World Bank (World Bank 2000) has estimated that that the cost of corruption worldwide 
amounts to $USD80 billion a year. A signifi cant amount of that cost is borne by the 
Asia-Pacifi c region. Despite endorsing an anti-corruption plan for the Asia Pacifi c, the 
governments of the region are burdened by endemic corruption that hampers governance 
in the region.
 Corruption’s impact on different areas of an economy, or on different macro 
variables, is a fairly new research area in economics which in recent times has been 
attracting further attention.*
 The organization of this article is as follows: the second section contains a discussion 
of related literature; the third section lays down the methodology, model specifi cation and 
discusses the data sources; the fourth section presents the empirical results derived from 
this article; and the fi nal section concludes the article. 
Review of Literature
Empirical literature differs on whether or not the effect of corruption is harmful to an 
economy or not. Some studies have advocated that corruption “greases the wheels” of 
business and commerce, thus facilitating growth and investment (Leff 1964; Lui 1985). 
Others have claimed that it does the reverse, viewing corruption as a primary impediment 
to growth and having dramatic consequences in the developing world (Mauro 1995; 
Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). 
Corruption and GDP per capita
The following section analyzes the literature that makes an association between corruption 
and the explanatory variables chosen in this article. 
 In the fi rst instance, we look at the association between per capita income and 
corruption. Mauro (1995) found a strong relationship between per capita income and an 
average of indices of red tape, ineffi cient judiciary, and corruption. 
 Easterly (1999) used several indicators, including the degree of corruption, to show 
how the quality of life across nations is positively associated with per capita income. 
 Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1996) also made a connection between high 
* For a review article on meaning and policy implications of corruption, see Bardhan  (1997).
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per capita income and high-quality institutions: freedom from expropriation, contract 
repudiation, corruption, and rule of law. 
 Husted (1999) and Olson, Sarna, Naveen and Swamy (1999) looked at the positive 
relationship between poverty and corruption: how the former reduces necessary resources 
to fi ght the latter. They maintain that transparency increases with income (i.e. per capita 
income).
 Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) examined the relationship between 
corruption and GDP per capita, taking into account simultaneity problems through the use 
of instrumental variables. They found that an increasing GDP per capita was a precursor 
to lower measures of corruption. 
Corruption and openness 
It was Krueger (1974) who pioneered the study of openness and corruption. She found 
that trade restrictions shift resources from productive activities to rent-seeking activities.
 Torrez (1995: 387-403) estimated the same relationship using four other control 
variables. He found that the negative relationship established by Kruger does not hold 
for the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, which also happens to be the 
biggest dataset.
 Kaufmann (1996) and Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) examined the growth of 
the unoffi cial economies, or black market economies, of Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
countries, which grew from 12 percent to 33 percent of the GDP (an average fi gure for all 
countries) during the 1989–1994 period, when these transition economies began to open 
up. The growth in the black market signals a concurrent growth in corruption to allow 
such growth. Hence they see openness as increasing corruption. 
Corruption and military expenditure 
Gray and Kaufmann (1998) examined how corruption in public spending increases 
inequality between rural and urban groups. Resources to rural public projects that are not 
easily manipulated are withheld, despite their higher social value. Instead, politicians and 
bureaucrats favor large-scale defense projects, as their value and secretive nature allow 
more opportunities for rent seeking behavior. 
 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) support these fi ndings with their study that revealed 
the “presence of corruption tends to increase the public investment while lowering its 
productivity.” They used measures of corruption, government revenue and quality of 
public investment in cross-country regressions (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). 
Methodology and Model Specifi cation
Methodology
In order to construct an empirically valid model to measure the impact of selected 
factors on the degree of corruption across countries, an ordered probit model is used. 
Such models are suited to the use of dependent variables that are discrete and inherently 
ordered into categories. They bear the closest resemblance to conventional linear models 
when analyzing ordered categorical data, and are also known as proportional odds models 
(Snapinn and Small, 1986).
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 Multinomial probit models would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variable, whereas linear regression would treat the rankings for their absolute 
values. Since both our dependent variables, the ICRG Index and the CPI, are ordinal 
rankings, the Ordered Probit model is preferred. 
  McKelvey and Zaviona and (1975) used such a model to analyze congressional 
voting in the United States on the Medicare bill in 1965. A similar model is used in this 
study, as shown in the formula below, where we use the ICRG index as the dependent 
variable.
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f point. 
In this case, Z is our unobserved latent variable, which is the underlying scale of the 
dependent variable. However, we observe the categories of Z that each country falls into. 
The error term is normalized with a mean and variance of zero and one respectively. 
There is no separate constant term with Z itself functioning as the constant term. The 
estimation technique used to solve the model is the Maximum-likelihood approach. The 
use of the CPI index as the dependent variable necessitates the adoption of a similar 
model. The latent variable Z here is divided into ten separate categories. Grouping in the 
lowest category (zero) signifi es a country that has the highest perception of corruption, 
with progressive increases indicating lower corruption, culminating in the CPI score of 
ten (i.e. lowest corruption perception). 
 This article uses linear regression to serve as a base for comparisons between Ordinary 
Least Squares regression (OLS) and Ordered Probit results. The possible endogenity 
problems were accounted for by the use of lag variables among the independent variables. 
The results are tested for validity and goodness of fi t using the standard tests for such 
models (i.e. the signifi cance of individual co-effi cients and McFadden R2).
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Model specifi cation
The methodology and the theoretical foundations of the ordered probit model described 
above serve as the basis for the econometric models used in this article. The defi nitions of 
each variable used are described below in Table I.
 The model used with the ICRG index (ICRG) as the dependent variable follows:
 ICRG PCI OPEN ME AL PDZ D E F G I J H        (1) 
 The model used with the CPI index (TI) as the dependent variable is similar, with only 
the dependent variable changed to refl ect the use of a different index as follows:
 CPI PCI OPEN ME AL PDZ D E F G I J H       (2) 
The coeffi cient for per capita GDP (PCI) is expected to beE <0 for the ICRG index 
(equation 1) (i.e. a higher per capita income in a country will have a negative effect on 
corruption in that country). The coeffi cient F , associated with the openness (OPEN) of 
an economy, is anticipated to be negative with the use of the ICRG index, as an increased 
openness in a domestic economy simultaneously brings transparency and effi ciency to 
its operations. It is expected that G >0, with the usage of ICRG index as the dependent 
variable, as a country with a higher component of its GDP used for military expenditure 
(ME) will be more susceptible to higher levels of misappropriation and as such, expenditure 
is seldom transparent. 
 Country variations are captured in the variables of arable land (AL) and population 
density (PD). It is anticipated that if countries have a higher percentage of arable land, this 
will result in a negative effect on the level of corruption (i.e. we expect I <0). The relative 
abundance of land (a source of income), if fairly distributed, would satisfy the economic 
needs of individuals and hinder rent-seeking behavior. However, there may be an opposite 
effect if there is a concentration of such land in a few elite hands. This mismatch leads to a 
duality in the application of the law that augurs badly for transparency and accountability 
(Alesina and Angeletos 2005).
 The reverse logic applies to population density (PD), where the expectation is that 
J >0. Countries with a higher density population are more likely to be categorized under 
the higher brackets of the corruption indices. This follows as the pressures of population 
place an increasing strain on governance, thus increasing corruption. The expected signs of 
the coeffi cients are reversed with the usage of the CPI Index (TI) as the dependent variable 
(equation 2), as higher values of the CPI Index indicate lower corruption perception or 
corruption, as opposed to the ICRG Index. The selected variables refl ect an effort to use 
data that has the least problems in terms of reverse causality. Both equation (1) and (2) are 
also used to conduct regression. 
Data sources
This article’s empirical analysis was conducted using different datasets for the dependent 
variables (i.e. the PRS and TI datasets). In the case of equation (1), six annually calculated 
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data series over twenty-two years (1984-2005) were used for fourteen countries from the 
Asia-Pacifi c region. The equation using the TI dataset also used six, annually calculated 
data series from 1995-2004 (ten years) for twelve countries from the Asia-Pacifi c region. 
The lower number of countries in this model is due to the lack of data availability for 
Brunei, Papua New Guinea and Mongolia in the TI dataset. However, the availability of 
data for Hong Kong in this same dataset led to its inclusion in equation (2). Except for 
these minor differences, both datasets use the same countries, providing a realistic base 
for comparison of the results. 
 The ICRG  Index, compiled by the Political Risk Services Group (PRS), a private 
fi rm, is the largest and most reliable dataset available on corruption. The ICRG utilizes 
a three-dimensional evaluation system that weighs the composite risk, while identifying 
desegregated political, fi nancial and economic risks by using a predetermined number of 
risk sub-indicators (Rahman et al. 2000). These are classifi ed into three central categories: 
political, fi nancial and economic (Rahman et al. 2000). The ICRG index is scaled for the 
purpose of this article into six categories, with zero representing the lowest degree of 
corruption and six representing the highest degree of corruption.
Table 1: Variables used in the model
Variables Defi nition
ICRG An index of corruption for countries with a maximum of 6 (highest risk) 
and a minimum of 0 (lowest risk).
CPI An index of corruption with a maximum of 10 (highest corruption) and a 
minimum of 0 (lowest corruption).
PCI GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by mid-year population. 
Data is in constant U.S. dollars.
OPEN The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP (openness of an 
economy).
ME Military expenditure data as a percent of GDP.
AL Arable land as a percent of total land area.
PD Population density is midyear population divided by land area in km2.
 Transparency International (TI) publishes yearly rankings of countries on the overall 
extent of corruption (frequency and/or amount of corruption) in the public and political 
sectors in its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI is calculated using data from 
14 sources originating from 12 independent institutions. A country’s mean value is set 
by undertaking a matching percentiles technique, which utilizes the ranks of countries 
reported by each individual source (Transparency International 2008). This is a useful 
method for combining sources that have different distributions, as it allows all reported 
scores to remain within the bounds of the CPI, that is, between zero and ten (Transparency 
International 2008). The accuracy of the confi dence interval estimates increases with a 
growing number of sources.
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Table 2: Asia-Pacifi c countries used in the study
CPI (TI) data ICRG (PRS) data
Australia Australia
China Brunei
Hong Kong China
Indonesia Indonesia
Japan Japan
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Malaysia Malaysia
New Zealand Mongolia
Philippines New Zealand
Singapore Papua New Guinea
Thailand Philippines
Vietnam Singapore
Thailand
 Vietnam
The World Development Indicators (WDI) database, maintained by the World Bank, was 
the source of data for real per capita GDP (PCI), arable land (AL), population density 
(PD), and military expenditure (ME). The data for real GDP per capita, which is in 
constant US dollars, was calculated without including any deductions for the depreciation 
of fabricated assets, nor for loss or degradation of natural resources.
 Data for openness (OPEN) was generated from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (PWT) 
online database, which is run by the Center for International Comparisons at the University 
of Pennsylvania (CICUP). PWT uses Price Purchasing Parity to standardize its data across 
countries. Openness in the PWT is defi ned as imports plus exports divided by real GDP. 
Empirical Results 
In this section the results of the estimation and the measures pertaining to the validity 
of the model will be presented. We use two well-known corruption indices, the ICRG 
(International Country Risk Guide) and the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) in our 
estimation. This ensures that we can check for robustness of results across different 
indices.
Ordered Probit Model regression results
We fi rst look at the results in Table III, which have been generated with the ordered probit 
model specifi ed earlier (equation (1)).
  Care in interpreting the results of ordered probit models is advised, as it is one of 
the least obvious models. Unlike conventional ordinary least squares (OLS), we do not 
interpret the coeffi cients of the independent variables with a direct relationship on the 
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dependent variable. The coeffi cients represent the amount of change that is brought about 
by a unit change in the independent variable on the dependent variable’s (hypothesized) 
underlying scale. The signs and the relative size of the coeffi cients are the fi rst measures 
we look at to evaluate the results of the model. 
 In the case of the ICRG data set, signs of all coeffi cients are as expected, with the 
exception of military expenditure (ME), which unexpectedly shows a negative sign (i.e. 
a one unit increase in the percent of GDP used to fi nance military expenditure leads to 
an increment in the probability of the country being in a lower response category, or less 
corrupt). The amount of arable land (AL)  to total land also reveals an unexpected sign. 
Importantly all the coeffi cients are small, testifying to the minimal impact of individual 
variables on the degree of corruption in a country.
 The coeffi cients are all signifi cant at the 5 percent level on the Z-table, except for 
the coeffi cient for Openness (OPEN). The coeffi cients for military expenditure (ME) and 
arable land (AL) are the largest among the independent variables. However, it would be 
unwise to read too much into these statistics for such a model. The difference between 
the log likelihood at iteration 0 (-363.73) is small when compared to the log likelihood at 
the last iteration 3 (-318.12), showing that the advantage of the model with independent 
variables, as compared to the null model, is negligible. The likelihood ratio shows that 
the probability of accepting the null hypothesis that the independent variables have no 
explanatory power is zero. The pseudo R2 or McFadden R2 shows a poor goodness of fi t 
for the model at 0.12. The results do not vary much when the variable for arable land (AL) 
is dropped from the model, or when both arable land (AL) and population density (PD) 
are excluded. However, the coeffi cient for openness (OPEN) does become signifi cant 
with the former specifi cation. (Restricted model I =0). 
Table 3: Ordered Probit Model showing the effect of selected factors on corruption 
in the Asia-Pacifi c region 
Latent variables: ICRG and CPI indices
  ICRGIndex   CPI Index  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
PCI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-7.74) (-8.25) (-8.04) (6.65) (7.37) (7.33)
OPEN -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.004 
(-1.04) (-2.29) (0.02) (3.00) (3.54) (1.88)
ME -0.105 -0.078 -0.081 0.816 0.806 0.317 
(-2.33) (-1.78) (-1.83) (3.20) (3.34) (1.69)
AL 0.035 -0.075 
(3.76) (-4.10) 
PD 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(2.30) (2.76) (-3.21) (-3.31)
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No. of 
Obs. 217 220 220 95 98 98 
Log Lik. -318 -331 -335 -131 -145 -150 
Psuedo R2 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.30 0.24 0.22 
  Interestingly results generated with the TI dataset (equation 2) mirror the 
relationships obtained with those of the ICRG dataset (equation 1). As in the case of 
equation (1), military expenditure (ME) and arable land (AL) seem to share an unexpected 
relationship within the corruption index (CPI). The goodness of fi t is much better than 
the results derived by using the ICRG dataset (R2=0.30). The coeffi cients are also all 
signifi cant at the 5 percent level, with the coeffi cients for military expenditure (ME) and 
arable land (AL) again proving to be the largest. Estimating the restricted model (I =0, J
=0) depresses the signifi cance levels for both openness (OPEN) and military expenditure 
(ME) and the goodness of fi t in general. 
 
Table 4: Ordered Probit Model (with correction for reverse causality) showing the 
effect of selected factors on corruption in the Asia-Pacifi c region
Latent variables: ICRG and CPI indices
  ICRGIndex   CPI Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
PCI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-7.59) (-8.11) (-8.00) (6.47) (7.32) (7.52)
OPEN -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.009 0.010 0.005 
(-0.90) (-2.21) (-0.22) (3.01) (3.69) (2.77)
MELAG -0.088 -0.060 -0.063 0.424 0.316 0.197 
(-1.99) (-1.38) (-1.45) (2.36) (1.92) (1.22)
AL 0.035 -0.082 
(3.81) (-4.44) 
PD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.00) (2.52) (-2.50) (-2.50)
No. of 
Obs. 216 219 219 94 98 98 
Log Lik. -317 -330 -333 -131 -148 -151 
Psuedo R2 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.21 
Having estimated the specifi ed model, we now deal with the possibility of reverse causality 
running from the corruption indices (ICRG and CPI) to military expenditure (ME). It is 
often with the intention of indulging in rent seeking behavior or misuse of public funds that 
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offi cials promote increased expenditure on large-scale opaque and secretive deals, such 
as military expenditure. The primary method to account for this problem is to introduce 
instrumental variables in the estimation. However, the properties of the instrumental-
variable ordered probit estimator have not yet been studied thoroughly enough. Thus, 
we instead introduce a lag term to the identifi ed variable military expenditure (ME). The 
logic here is that the current year’s corruption, or corruption perception, cannot affect the 
previous year’s military expenditure (ME). The results (Table IV), however, differ very 
little from our estimation without lag terms for the ICRG dataset. Pseudo R2 is slightly 
lower, with all coeffi cients falling slightly.
 However, the difference between the log likelihood at iteration 0 (-361.17) is small 
compared to the log likelihood at the last iteration 3 (-317.20), showing that the model 
with all explanatory variables does not possess much of an advantage over the null model. 
The results using the TI dataset echo those resulting from the estimating equation (1). 
However, a previously insignifi cant openness coeffi cient in our restricted model becomes 
signifi cant on using lag variables in our estimation. 
 Importantly, the previous empirical literature linking corruption with per capita 
income and openness seem to be vindicated for both datasets (ICRG and TI), albeit the 
relationship between the variables seems weak when viewed by the small coeffi cients.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results
The estimation of the same basic models using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
serves as a basis for comparisons between regression and ordered probit results. This 
allows us to see if the results are robust when applied to different estimation techniques. 
In order to facilitate this comparison we fi rst ‘normalized’ the data, ensuring that each of 
the data series had a zero mean and standard deviation of one.
 OLS results with the ICRG index (Table V) point to a better goodness of fi t, showing 
0.34 in the ICRG index and a high 0.71 for the TI index in the case of the unrestricted 
model. In terms of the signs of the coeffi cients, they are repeated from the ordered probit 
estimate for both the ICRG and TI indexes from Table 3. All coeffi cients are signifi cant 
for both the ICRG and TI indexes, except for openness (OPEN) under the ICRG index 
in estimations (1) and (3). The results reveal that GDP per capita (PCI), arable land (AL) 
and population density (PD) seem to play the biggest role in explaining variations in the 
degree of corruption in a country in this index. 
Table 5: Regression showing the effect of selected factors on corruption in the Asia-
Pacifi c region
 Dependent variables: ICRG and CPI indices
  ICRGIndex   CPI Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.006 -0.010 -0.024 -0.043 -0.001 0.071 
(-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.44) (-0.68) (-0.01) (1.06)
PCI -0.503 -0.552 -0.460 0.652 0.817 0.713 
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(-8.52) (-9.23) (-8.96) (8.67) (10.0) (10.5)
OPEN -0.123 -0.240 -0.007 0.265 0.434 0.220 
(-1.24) (-2.45) (-0.13) (1.95) (2.80) (1.80)
ME -0.142 -0.113 -0.120 0.231 0.262 0.085 
(-2.51) (-1.96) (-2.05) (1.86) (1.84) (0.71)
AL 0.208 -0.366 
(3.75) (-5.74) 
PD 0.234 0.284 -0.433 -0.530 
(2.40) (2.87) (-2.08) (-2.18)
No. of 
Obs. 217 220 220 95 98 98 
F-statistic 23 25 29 48 39 48 
 R2 (adj.) 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.71 0.61 0.59 
 The TI index, on the other hand, allows openness (OPEN) to play a larger role in 
explaining variations in the degree of corruption in a country. Estimations (2) and (3) 
under the TI index reveal that the goodness of fi t in equation (2) falls, with the exclusion 
of arable land (AL) and population density (PD), from the model. The signifi cance of 
the coeffi cient attached to military expenditure (ME) in particular is reduced with the 
restricted models used in estimations (3). Another notable change is the larger negative 
coeffi cients for population density (PD) for estimations (1) and (2) in the CPI index. 
Thus, the CPI index shows a negative effect on corruption with higher population density 
when using OLS estimation. In general, the trends reported in Table 3 using the Ordered 
Probit Model are repeated with the use of linear regression for both equation (1) and (2), 
albeit with a better goodness of fi t.
 The approach employing lag variables to account for the endogenity problem is 
also attempted here. The results (Table 6) differ very little from the regression results 
presented in Table 5. There is, however, a slight fall in the explanatory power of the 
model, except for estimation (2) using equation (2), as seen by the adjusted R2. The 
coeffi cients and signifi cance of several variables also falls on introducing lag variables 
into our estimation, particularly the lag variable itself (MELAG). It would appear from 
these results that the suspected reverse causality between corruption indices (ICRG and 
CPI) and military expenditure (ME) is not as serious as initially thought. Hence, the 
inclusion of lag variables in our models does not bring about much change in the results. 
However, it must be remembered that the coeffi cient of military expenditure (ME) showed 
an unexpected sign in all the estimations. Thus, any possible reverse causality is plausibly 
negated by the seemingly unexpected effect that higher military expenditure has on the 
corruption indices. 
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Table 6: Ordinary least squares regression with time lags
Dependent variables: (ICRG and CPI indices)
  ICRGIndex   CPI Index  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.003 0.001 -0.011 -0.021 0.033 0.065 
(0.06) (0.01) (-0.21) (-0.34) (0.50) (1.00)
PCI -0.493 -0.542 -0.459 0.627 0.793 0.712 
(-8.33) (-9.05) (-8.90) (8.49) (9.91) (10.8)
OPEN -0.110 -0.232 -0.020 0.267 0.468 0.267 
(-1.10) (-2.38) (-0.36) (1.97) (3.06) (2.66)
MELAG -0.124 -0.091 -0.098 0.142 0.087 0.035 
(-2.21) (-1.59) (-1.70) (1.56) (0.85) (0.36)
AL 0.211 -0.383 
(3.76) (-5.96) 
PD 0.206 0.258 -0.316 -0.341 
(2.20) (2.62) (-1.73) (-1.73)
No. of 
Obs. 216 219 219 94 98 98 
F-statistic 22 24 28 48 38 49 
 R2 (adj.) 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.72 0.60 0.60 
Conclusions
This article was undertaken to verify the prior academic work that links openness, as 
defi ned by the ratio of volume of international trade to a country’s GDP, with a reduction in 
corruption (Krueger, 1974,and Torrez, 2005) for the Asia-Pacifi c region. Torrez’s fi nding 
that the relationship between corruption and openness was not robust across different 
indices of corruption was disproved in the case of the Asia-Pacifi c region. However, the 
analysis revealed a weak relationship between openness and corruption for the ICRG 
index estimations (1) and (3) across all estimation methods. Nevertheless, the coeffi cient 
for openness was signifi cant when using the CPI as the dependent variable. 
 The other objective of this article was to analyze the second most accepted idea or 
notion or perception that associates a rise in per capita GDP with a reduction in corruption 
for the Asia-Pacifi c region. This idea was supported by the results of this study, although 
the strength of the relationship between per capita GDP and corruption depends on the 
index used. Its effect seems to be negligible, given the low coeffi cient values in the ordered 
probit estimations. However, the regression results seem to demonstrate a bigger impact 
of per capita GDP on corruption. Importantly, the nature of the relationship was robust 
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across the different estimation techniques used.
 The expected nature of the relationship between corruption and military expenditure 
did not materialize, irrespective of the estimation technique or index used. This was also 
the case for the other variable, arable land (AL). Thus, estimations using data on corruption 
will give differing results depending on the dataset used. Time lags to correct for reverse 
causality made little difference in the estimations, with the exception of a lowering in 
goodness of fi t for the estimations, making several variables insignifi cant. This was due to 
the unexpected relationship military expenditure (ME) shared with corruption. Ordinary 
Linear regression (OLS) estimates give slightly better results with a higher goodness of 
fi t (R2). 
 Therefore, the countries of the Asia-Pacifi c region can negate the effects of corruption 
with greater openness in their economies, increasing economic growth with an emphasis 
on increasing distribution, and more effective family planning to reduce populations in the 
long term. Better regional dispersion of populations and accompanying decentralization 
could also be effective in reducing corruption in the short and medium term.
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